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Abstract
The relationship between democracy and economic growth has long been inves-
tigated both in the political science and in the economic literature with inconclusive
outcomes. By adopting a multi-level meta-analysis framework, we tried to shed
lights on this conundrum. Our hierarchical sample includes 103 studies contain-
ing 942 point-estimates. Our random effects model suggests that the sign of this
relationship, albeit positive, is statistically weak. We then address the high between-
studies heterogeneity by adopting meta-regression analysis models. Results are
striking: the effect sizes’ variance is largely driven by spatial and temporal dif-
ferences in the samples, indicating that the democracy and growth nexus is not
homogeneous across world regions and time periods. Conversely, the large number
of control variables included in the papers, do not impact the reported results. At
the same time, models estimated by means of the within estimator have a significant,
albeit negative, impact on economic growth. This seems to suggest that scholars
have not yet found the appropriate control variables - or their suitable proxies - to
explain such widely debated relationship.
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1 Introduction
Growth economists have long being studying, through quantitative methods, the
determinants of cross-country differences in GDP levels and rates of change. While
the first attempts of empirical investigations date back to the mid-1980s, it is only in
the early 1990s (see among others Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i Martin, 1992) that
regression methods have been extensively applied to the subject. In their simplest form,
growth regressions involve a measure of economic growth as dependent variable and
its alleged determinant(s) as independent variable(s), so that:
y = α + β1x1 + β2x2 + · · ·+ βnxn +  (1)
Where y is the growth rate of the economy, x1 · · ·xn its explanatory variables and 
the error term. Unfortunately, as Sala-i Martin (1997) notes, economic growth theories
are usually not explicit in stating which are the variables that matter most for a country
to prosper. This, in turn, brought an accumulation of evidences that was, at best,
disorderly.
This has been (and still is) particularly true for social scientists who focused on
the institutional determinants of economic growth. Among them, several engaged
in a debate - not always independent of ideological burdens - regarding the impact
of democratic institutions on the living standards of the population. Despite sev-
eral attempts, consensus has been far from being reached. As Sirowy and Inkeles
noted “many of the central questions pertaining to the developmental consequences
of political democracy remain, by and large, unresolved”; furthermore, “the relevant
quantitative, cross-national research continues to be plagued by conflicting findings”
(Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990, p. 127). Few years later, similar conclusions have been
reached by Przeworski and Limongi: when it comes to the nexus between democratic
institutions and economic development, “social scientists know surprisingly little”
(Przeworski and Limongi, 1993, p. 51).
In fact, despite the democracy and growth conundrum benefited from renewed
attention after the influential contribution by Barro (1996) and the introduction of
more sophisticated econometric techniques (such as System GMM), the key question
remained largely undressed (Knutsen, 2012).
A single paper is unlikely to solve this puzzle. Within a classical hypothesis test-
ing framework, a null hypothesis is posed against an alternative; whether the null
hypothesis is rejected or accepted, depends upon a single test statistics exceeding
or not an arbitrary critical value. Therefore, as the American Statistical Association
explains, despite “researchers often wish to turn a p-value into a statement about the
truth of a null hypothesis”, the p-value is just “a statement about data in relation to a
specified hypothetical explanation” (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016, p. 131). Scientific
conclusions should then not be based only on whether a single test statistics passes a
specific threshold. As De Long and Lang noted, “since no individual test is definitive,
it is somewhat surprising that the rhetoric of article writing suggests that a single test
or series of tests in the individual article is conclusive” (De Long and Lang, 1992, p.
1258).
A more statistically appropriate methodology to draw a more robust, albeit not
definitive, inference about an alleged relation is the one followed by Doucouliagos and
1
CSCC Working Papers 03/17
Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008). By applying a meta-regression analysis to a sample of 483 estimates
included in 84 studies, these authors investigated the causes behind the ambivalent
results obtained in the literature on the relation between democracy and economic
growth.
Using modern meta-analysis techniques and a new, larger and up-to-date sample of
studies, we build upon the research by Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008) to better
unravel the democracy and growth conundrum.
In their meta-analysis, Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu choose not to include working
papers and unpublished literature as a way to control for the quality of the effect
sizes included in the sample. Yet, if publication bias occurs in this literature, then it
might results in a prejudice against the null hypothesis, hence an over-representation of
statistical significant results within the sample (Rothstein et al., 2006a). We therefore
also included 23 unpublished paper in our sample. Moreover, we decided to collect
all point estimates included in each study, to avoid introducing a further bias in the
selection process. By adopting such an approach however our observations are unlikely
to be independent from each other, since effect sizes collected from the same study
are likely contingent on each other, an issue sometimes called hierarchical dependence
(Stevens and Taylor, 2009). To deal with it, we resorted to multilevel models.
The remaining of the papers is organized as follows: section 2 briefly reviews the
literature on growth determinants, especially focusing on the role of democracy. Section
3 outlines the preliminary steps that we undertook to perform our meta-analysis,
explains how we computed our effect size measures and introduces the multilevel
model that we will adopt. Finally, section 5 presents and discusses the results we
obtained, before drawing our conclusions, presented in section 6.
2 Modern economic growth theories; a review
The theoretical framework in which the empirical analyses upon the determinants of
economic growth and the disparities in growth rates across countries can be traced back
to Solow (1956). In describing the dynamics of economic growth, such model assumes
that the increase in the aggregate production of goods and services is determined by
the growth in the stock of capital (K), labor force (or population, L) and the level of
technology (A), which lately became mostly known as the Total Factor Productivity
(TFP).
TFP accounts for all the omitted factors - such as institutions, resource endowments,
climate, and the literacy and skills of the workforce, and is said exogenous. This
characteristic, alongside the diminishing marginal returns assumption, leads the model
to predict steady-state convergence.
The mathematical versatility of the Solow model resulted in a large success, thereby
offering favorable foundation for different extensions1. Yet, a mounting discontent
with the inability of the original neoclassical paradigm to justify increasingly divergent
growth patterns led to the development of alternative growth models. Starting from the
1Cass (1965) and Koopmans et al. (1965) integrated the analysis of consumer optimization into the
original textbook Solow model; as a result, the savings rate, which were exogenous in the Solow (1956)
model, became endogenous.
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mid-1980s, a new group of theories tried to offer a endogenous explanation of economic
growth. This new breed of theories challenged the firsts modern growth models in
postulating that physical and labor capital are the only two observable inputs in the
production function. Instead, emphasis was given to human capital and other forms of
intangible capital like knowledge, considering it as the result of intentional investment
in education and formation (Romer, 1990; Lucas, 1988)2.
The idea of absolute convergence across different economies became a rather unre-
alistic assumption. In the augmented growth models, the convergence assumed by
Solow (1956) became conditional upon other parameters including propensity to save
and investment rate, fertility choices and population growth, state technology, trade
agreements, education policies, and legal frameworks. Many of the latter can be linked
to one encompassing concept: institutions (e.g. Gwartney et al. 1999; (e.g. Acemoglu
et al., 2014; Gwartney et al., 2006; De Haan et al., 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik
et al., 2004).
2.1 The role of institutions and political regimes
Despite an initial fierce debate on the role of institutions in determining individual
economic behavior and, above all, aggregate performance, starting in the late 1990s
economists widely acknowledged that “institutions matter” (Acemoglu et al., 2001, p.
1370).
In simple terms, institutions represent “systems of established and embedded social
rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson, 2006, p. 13). Therefore, institutions
can influence the incentive structure by affecting the underlying economic context,
potentially curbing or fostering economic activity, as pointed out by North (1990).
Much of the literature, by adopting already existing indices of political regimes,
focused on the impact of democracy on economic growth. Such tradition dates back
to the seminal comparative study of Lipset (1959) and gained a further momentum in
the aftermath of the global economic and financial crisis. Notwithstanding the vast
amount of empirical research spurred on the topic, results were mostly contrasting
and inconclusive3. The first meta-analysis on the issue (Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu,
2008) found that a positive coefficient was found in 27% of the cases, while in 37% it
was positive but not significant and in 36% it was either negative or negative and not
2Romer (1990) pointed out that private firms have an incentive to invest in research and development
to differentiate their production and gain market power. In this context, the productivity of human
capital is higher when it is combined with the previous stock of knowledge, through a self-reinforcing
process of accumulation (Romer, 1990). This can explain why countries might end up in different
steady-state growth paths. Lucas (1988), on the other end, tried to solve the dilemma of divergent
national productivity rates by taking into account the rigidity in the international patterns of migration
and wage levels. Since the human capital cannot freely flow from a country to another, the differences in
initial stocks of human capital are translated in differences into productivity - that is, lower levels of
human capital in poor countries determine their lower productivity.
3As an example, Przeworski (2000) shows that though the direct relation is quite inconclusive,
dictatorship tend to allocate capital more efficiently , while democracies (in high income countries)
produce more output per capita. Studies focusing on levels of democracy (rather than regime transitions)
identified either negative but not significant (Helliwell, 1994) or negative and slightly significant (Barro,
1996) or inverse-U shaped (Barro et al., 2003) relations, with low or no statistical significance
3
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significant (Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu, 2008, p. 62). In the same study, the authors
suggest that other factor, as human capital, possibly act as channels of transmission.
Several scholars focused on such possible channels. One of the arguments in fa-
vor of the beneficial effects of democracy on economic growth focuses on democratic
institutions as a mean to guarantee property rights (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993).
Another argument considers the ability of democratic institutions to assist production
and maximize the total output by guaranteeing private activity or stimulating it di-
rectly by supplying inputs; supposedly, autocratic rulers have less incentives to do so
(Barro, 1991; Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Olson, 1993). Minier (1998) explored the
possibility of a productivity enhancing role of democracy, driven by a more efficient
allocation of production factors compared to autocratic regimes. In a different study,
Rodrik and Wacziarg found that the process of democratization exerts a positive though
heterogeneous effect on growth, where heterogeneity depends on the consolidation of
democracy itself (Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005).
Conversely, a consistent body of scholars perceived the relation between develop-
ment and political democracy as conflicting or even incompatible (Huntington, 1987).
Democracy and economic growth are considered to be competing concerns and trade
off in the political sphere are necessary to achieve growth (Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990).
Following Przeworski and Limongi (1993), the essential dynamic through which democ-
racy is believed to hamper growth are political pressures for immediate consumption,
which reduce the level of investments. Furthermore, whereas there is agreement on the
benefits of securing property rights, it is controversial whether dictatorships can better
secure these rights (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993). Finally, authoritarian regimes can
be more effective in timely implementing the kinds of policies reputed necessary to
boost growth (Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990).
The presence of a large number of contrasting scientific results configures democ-
racy and growth as one of the best playing fields to perform meta-analysis. In the next
section (3), we introduce this framework and present the model adopted in the paper.
3 Meta-analysis and meta-regression analysis; fixed and
random effect(s) models
The term meta-analysis was first introduced by Glass, who defines it as “the statistical
analysis of a large collection of analysis results from individual studies for the purpose
of integrating the findings” of a “rapidly expanding research literature” (Glass, 1976, p.
3)4. Meta-analysis is designed to avoid possible biases that might arise in the context of
qualitative reviews, such as the choices, made by the reviews’ authors, of which papers
to include or not include, or how to weight them, based on their own prior beliefs on
the topic (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989). In its simplest application, meta-analysis concerns
the collection of effect sizes shared by empirical studies which are then aggregated
using a weighted average. The weights are usually a measure of the precision of the
primary studies, such as their sample size or their standard errors. Theoretically, such
aggregation increases statistical power - i.e. decreases the probability of type II errors -
4However, as Hedges note, “physicists had been doing meta-analysis for 50 years before the term had
been coined; they just called it reviewing [...]” (Hedges, 2015, p. 284)
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and allows practitioners to draw more robust conclusions regarding whether an effect
exists or not, as opposed to a less precise measure derived from a single study.
Meta-regression analysis involves the regression of the observed effect sizes on one
or multiple study characteristics. As such, meta-regression analysis could be seen as a
body of statistical tools to find and account for systematic differences in the size of the
effect or outcome that is being meta-analyzed (Stanley, 2001).
Meta-analysis and meta-regression analysis can prove particularly useful when
the empirical evidences on a topic are mixed or, as in the case of the literature on
democratic institutions and economic growth, conflicting. Specifically, meta-analysis
could help detecting whether democracies have an impact upon growth, and, if they
do, what is the direction and the strength of such influence. Meta-regression analyses,
on the other hand, could help unravel what Stanley and Jarrell (1989) call the specifi-
cation problem - the fact that different samples, estimators and covariates gave rise to
disparate results. By introducing such specifications as regressors, meta-regressions
help assessing whether they have an impact upon the results obtained by the scholars
engaged in the democracy and growth debate.
3.1 Fixed and random effect(s) models in meta-analysis
Meta-analysis models are usually divided between fixed and random effects models
(Borenstein et al., 2010)5. The main intuition behind the former is that the difference in
the effect sizes collected is given by sampling variation. In other words, if the sample in
each primary analysis converges towards infinity, each study will document the same
effect size. Analytically, being i = 1, . . . ,n the studies in the meta-analytic sample, the
fixed effect model can be written as:
yi = θ + εi , εi ∼N (0,v2i ) (2)
where yi is any effect size measure (raw coefficients, partial correlation, t-statistics
. . . ), θ is the underlying (true) effect and εi is the error term that is assumed to be
normally distributed with mean 0 and variance v2i - the sampling error. Erroneously, few
authors confuse the variance components of the fixed effect model with an homogeneity
assumption; indeed, as mere examples of a spread misunderstanding of the model, Rose
and Stanley (2005, p. 351) and De Dominicis et al. (2008, p. 662), after correctly stating
that [in fixed effect models] the different magnitude of the estimates is solely due to sampling
variation, argue that such models [assume that] there is no heterogeneity across studies.
Such homogeneity assumption is not, at best, entirely correct. As Hedges and Vevea
(1998) note, fixed effect models are capable of perfectly valid inferences even under
heterogeneity conditions as long as we limit these inferences to the sample of studies
collected in the meta-analysis itself. If the practitioners interest lies in inferring only
from the set of studies included in the meta-sample, even in presence of substantial
5Unfortunately, as Gelman and Hill (2006, p. 245) note, within applied statistics there are at least
five different, and sometimes conflicting, definitions of what random and fixed effect(s) models are. This
issue is exacerbated by the fact that meta-analysis methods embrace different disciplines, each one of
them with its own peculiar jargon. To further ravel the problem, the rationales behind meta-analysis
random and fixed effects models are not always flawlessly understood.
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heterogeneity among the underlying effects, a fixed effect approach is more appropriate
than a random effect one (Hedges and Vevea, 1998).
In other words, the discrimination between the fixed and random effect(s) mod-
els should not be based on the potential heterogeneity or homogeneity of the sample,
but rather on the type of inference that we are ultimately interested in performing
(Viechtbauer et al., 2010). If researchers objective is to summarize the results of their
meta-sample only - what is known as conditional inference - then they should consider
employing fixed effect models. Conversely, when the interest lies in drawing a more
general conclusion regarding an empirical relation not bounded to the set of studies
included in the meta-analysis - an unconditional inference - random effect(s) models are
suggested.
Unconditional inference is obtained by explicitly assuming that the effect sizes
included in the meta-analysis are a random sample of all the effect sizes available or,
in other words, that the papers included in the meta-analysis database are a random
sample of the population of studies on the topic. Analytically, with i = 1, . . . ,n being
the studies in the sample, this is given by:
yi = µ+ ηi + εi , εi ∼N (0,v2i ), ηi ∼N (0, τ2) (3)
where yi is the effect size measure, µ is the underlying average (true) effect, εi is the
variance components that is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and vari-
ance v2i (the sampling error) and ηi is the random effect introduced to model variability
among true effects. Equation 3 can be seen a special case of a multilevel/hierarchical
model (Konstantopoulos, 2011). It is indeed possible to partition the model into two
levels:
yi = θi + εi , εi ∼N (0,v2i ) (4)
equation 4 represents the within-study component of the random effect model. It
differs from the fixed effect equation 2 because it introduces a random effect, θi , which
is defined at the second level - the between-studies part - of the model:
θi = µ+ ηi , ηi ∼N (0, τ2) (5)
equation 5 explicitly model the variability introduced at the first level among the
true effects treating it as purely random. It is easy to show that if the effects sizes are
actually homogeneous then θ1 = θ2 = · · · = θi ≡ θ, that is, the fixed and random effect
models are equivalent. There are however no unbiased instruments to test whether the
true effects are really homogeneous or not (Viechtbauer et al., 2010), yet another reason
to not choose which model to adopt based on the alleged homogeneity of the sample
but, as above-mentioned, on the desired inference6.
6Fixed effect model can be fitted adopting a weighted or unweighted least squares. Conversely,
random effect(S) models are estimated through a two-steps approach. First, the residual heterogeneity
τ2 is estimated through one of the several estimators proposed in the literature. Next, the model
parameters are estimated via weighted least squares with weights equal to wi = 1/(vi + τˆ2), with τˆ2 being
the estimate of τ2. We will perform such estimation by adopting the Restricted (Residual) Maximum
Likelihood Estimator (REML). As Viechtbauer observes, such estimator “strikes a good balance between
unbiasedness and efficiency” (Viechtbauer, 2005, p. 291).
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3.1.1 Multilevel random effects model
Our sample is composed by 942 effect sizes collected from 103 papers. While there
are no reasons to believe that between-studies observations are not independent, it is
possible to argue that, within-study, observations are contingent upon each other. Point
estimates collected from the same research are in fact likely to use similar samples,
specifications and estimation techniques. Such particular data structure is known as
hierarchical dependence (Stevens and Taylor, 2009); if unaccounted, models’ estimation
fails in delivering a correct inference (De Dominicis et al., 2008)7.
To handle hierarchical dependence we apply multilevel models, which can naturally
handle the hierarchy of our sample Gelman and Hill (2006). Here we will show how
they can be applied to meta-analysis random effect models. We begin by assuming
i = 1, . . . ,n studies (our level-3 units) and j = 1, . . . , k observations, the end points
collected. The first level of the model, the within-observations part, is composed by:
yij = θij + εij , εij ∼N (0,v2ij) (7)
where yij are the effect sizes collected from all the different studies, θij are the
underlying (true) effects and v2ij is the variance of the sampling error. The second level
(the between-observations within-study part) is then given by:
θij = µj + ηij , ηij ∼N (0,σ2W ) (8)
where µj is the average (true) outcome at study level and σ
2
W is the between-
observations within-study variance. Finally, at the third and last level, the between-
studies part of the model is detailed as:
µj = γ00 +υ0j , υ0j ∼N (0,σ2B) (9)
where γ00 is the average (true) outcome and σ
2
B is the between-studies variance. As
all multilevel/hierarchical models, we can write our model on a single level notation,
such as:
yij = γ00 +υ0j + ηij + εij (10)
where γ00 is the average (true outcome), υ0j is the random effect that allows for
heterogeneity between-studies, ηij is the random effect that allows for heterogeneity
within-study and εij is the sampling error.
Equation 10 can be easily extended to accommodate a random effects meta-regression
analysis. Since our interest lies in tackling the specification problem - that is, finding and
7We assess such possibility by computing the Intra-class Correlation Coefficient (ICC), which is given
by:
ICC =
σ2B
σ2B + σ
2
W
(6)
where σ2B is the between-studies variance component while σ
2
W is the between-observations within-
study variance component (Viechtbauer et al., 2010). We document an ICC value of 0.773, indicating
that point estimates collected from the same study are, on average, highly correlated.
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estimating the sources of heterogeneity at between-studies level - we add q predictors
at the third level of the model. We can then rewrite equation 9 - the between-studies
level of the multilevel random effects meta-analysis - as:
µj = γ00 +γ01ω1g + . . .+γ0gωqg +υ0j , υ0j ∼N (0,σ2R) (11)
where ω1g , . . . ,ωqg are level-3 unit specific predictors and γ1g , . . . ,γ0g their coeffi-
cients. The variance of υ0j is now written as σ
2
R, since it now indicates the residual
variance between-studies (Konstantopoulos, 2011). On a single level notation, such
three-level random effects meta-regression model can be written as:
yij = γ00 +γ01ω1g + . . .+γ0gωqg +υ0j + ηij + εij , υ0j ∼N (0,σ2R) (12)
Since the predictors are added at the third level of the model, the number of
observations used to compute the degrees of freedom correspond to the number of
level-three units – that is, the number of studies in the meta-sample - and not the
number of end-points. Adding too many predictors could therefore (rightfully) raise
over-fitting concerns - and possibly multicollinearity issues. While there is no best
practice on such an issue yet, we find reasonable the rule of thumb proposed by
Van Houwelingen et al. (2002), which argue that practitioners should not exceed one
explanatory variable every 5 to 10 level-three units.
4 The meta-sample
The selection process has been conducted following the reporting guidelines for meta-
regression analyses in economics (Stanley et al., 2013). Such guidelines require meta-
analysis practitioners to explicitly state the ex-ante inclusion (and exclusion) criteria
adopted while searching the literature of interest.
Explanatory and control variables We began by collecting point estimates from all
regressions outputs containing a proxy for economic growth as dependent variable and
a measure of democratization as independent variable. While such criteria might seem
obvious, it is appropriate to issue a caveat here. Econometric models often divide the X
matrix of independent variables into a vector xe, containing the explanatory variable,
and a Xc matrix, containing the control variables. Such model specification is designed
to allow readers to focus on the relationship between the dependent variable and the
explanatory variable by removing the influence of the control variables. Statistically,
however, such partition is only conceptual; xe and Xc are input in the model in the same
way. Therefore, when a primary study presents the independent variable in which
we are interested in as control variable, we coded it regardless of the aforementioned
distinction.
Published and unpublished literature Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008) choose
not to include working papers and unpublished articles to control for the research
quality. We however agree with Stanley, who argues that “differences in quality, data
or methods do not provide a valid justification for omitting studies” (Stanley, 2001, p.
8
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135), but rather that such differences provide rationale for performing a meta-analysis
and a meta-regression analysis in the first place. Furthermore, publication status is at
least a controversial way to asses the quality of an article, there are other reasons why a
paper might not have been published beside its dubious virtues.
There are indeed reasons to believe that the published literature might be affected
by publication biases and the so-called prejudice against the null hypothesis, the preference
by editors and reviewers of academic journal for studies showing statistical signifi-
cant results over studies unable to reject the null hypothesis (Rothstein et al., 2006b).
Retrieving only published studies might potentially lead to an over-representation of
statistically significant results, challenging the random sampling assumptions underly-
ing meta and meta-regression analyses random effects models. We therefore included
both published and unpublished papers. A failure in doing so might severely threatens
the unbiasedness of the results.
Multiple end-points For the same above-mentioned reasons, we decided not to dis-
criminate between what authors indicate as best specification and the other outcomes
contained in the primary researches, hence collecting (and computing) all available
estimates per study.
Granger causality test Furthermore, while Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008)
include in their sample few studies containing Granger causality test only, we decided
not to do so. Leaving aside the debate over the effectiveness of such methods, we
believe the interpretation of its point estimates to be different than the one collected
from linear (and non-linear) regressions. Finally, we investigated only articles written
in English in which data are collected only from the 1950s onwards. Articles including
historical data-sets were excluded from our sample.
Starting on 19 January 2016 we began the literature search process to build the
meta-sample; such task was divided in four steps:
1. we started by querying SSRN, RePEc, Web of Science, Econlit, Jstor and Science
Direct with the following research string: "democracy" AND "growth" (or equiv-
alent). After a preliminary leaf through, 109 papers were added into our sample;
2. the second phase involved the analyses of the bibliographies of the qualitative
reviews investigating the democracy and growth literature. This yielded further
19 papers to be added to the initial 109;
3. we then moved towards a snowballing sampling approach by using the Google
Scholar citation system. We identified some of the most cited papers investigating
the democracy and growth conundrum and after performing a reverse search
upon them we added 12 additional articles to our sample;
4. finally, we performed an inspection of the sample collected by Doucouliagos and
Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008), founding 49 supplementary papers.
We concluded the literature search process by rigorously scrutinizing the sample
obtained. Starting on 21 March 2016, we coded the articles that conformed to the
9
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ex-ante criteria previously highlighted; studies that failed to comply were excluded
from the sample. Overall, the process yielded 942 effect sizes nested around 103 papers
comprising 924460 primary observations.
4.1 Effect size measures
We computed two different effect size measures; a Fisher’s z-transform of the partial
correlation and a discrete indicator that classifies documented point estimates into
positive, negative, and non-significant ones at the 10% significance level, allowing a
direct comparison with the results of Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008). The partial
correlation was computed following Aloe and Thompson (2013):
Rp =
tf√
t2f + df
(13)
where tf is the t statistic of the regression coefficient βf while df is the degrees
of freedom (n− p − 1) in which p is the number of regressors and n is the number of
observations. The sample variance of the partial correlation, again following Aloe and
Thompson (2013), was instead given by:
var(rp) =
(1− r2p )2
n− p − 1 (14)
the values obtained were then normalized accordingly to the Fisher’s z-score trans-
formation. The motivation behind such choice is twofold; meta-analytic methods
usually assume that the sampling distribution of the observed outcomes is (at least
approximately) normal. When ρ (the population correlation) in a particular study is
far away from 0 and the sample size is small, the sampling distribution of the raw
(partial) correlation becomes very skewed and is not well approximated by a normal
distribution. Fisher’s z-score corrects for skewness. Moreover, to calculate the variance,
the unknown value of ρ should be estimated. This can be done, as shown in equation
14, by plugging the observed (partial) correlation (i.e. Rp) into the equation. This will
provide an estimate of the sampling variance, but this happens to be a rather inaccurate
estimate, especially in small samples. On the other hand, the sampling variance of an
Fisher’s z-score transformed correlation is (approximately) equal to:
var(z) =
1
n− 3 (15)
which no longer depends on unknown quantities. Ultimately, a positive Fisher’s
z-score indicates a positive relation between the strength of democratic institutions
and economic growth, while a negative Fisher’s z-score indicates a negative relation 8.
8Social scientists have developed several indexes to (try to) quantify the qualitative concept of
democracy. However, not all the indexes have the same direction. Therefore, before performing our
analysis, we transformed all our effect sizes on a positive scale - i.e. the lowest the values the lowest is
the level of democratization, the highest the value the highest is the democratic score.
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4.2 Descriptive statistics
With regards to the dependent variables, the large majority of the effect sizes included
in our sample (i.e. 793 versus 149) are computed by adopting GDP growth rates rather
than GDP levels.
According to our discrete indicator, 34 papers within the meta-sample exhibit, on
average, a positive and statistically significant relation between democracy and growth,
19 a negative and significant one, while the vast majority (50) reports non-significant
coefficients.
By analyzing the 942 end-points collected, we observe that 360 are statistically
insignificant at the 10% while 201 present a negative direction and 380 a positive one.
Results however scatter widely depending on the democracy index used.
Negative Non-significant Positive Total
Study average 19 50 34 103
Effect sizes
Polity Index 73 106 116 295
Freedom House 61 142 132 335
Dummy Variable 34 49 76 159
Other 33 64 56 153
Total 201 361 380 942
Table 1: Effect size discrete indicator at 10% significance level
At a glance, effect size estimated in regressions including as proxy for democracy the
Freedom House Indexes are more likely to point towards a positive impact. Conversely,
if democratic institutions are captured by dummy variables or by the Polity Index,
outcomes are more scattered. These findings seem to suggest that the independent
variable adopted might help explaining the heterogeneous results obtained in the
literature. Yet, our sample is unbalanced, with some studies contributing with more
effect sizes than others. Five studies detailed more than 50 regression coefficients while
33 documented three or less effect sizes, six of which only one. With regards to the
year of publication, which impact on the sample time span, the oldest article within
our sample has been published in 1985 while the newest one in 2016. There are 4
researches from the 1980s, 30 from the 1980s, 40 from the 2000s and 29 reporting a
date after 2010. Therefore, we advise caution in drawing preliminary conclusions from
the discrete indicator.
We then defined articles as published if their publication outlet is included in the Re-
search Papers in Economics (RePEc) database. Overall, 689 point estimates are collected
from 80 published articles while 253 from 23 unpublished papers. 12 papers appears
on political science journal series while 89 belong to economics-focused publications.
Moreover, 75 out of 103 studies have been conducted by at least one author affiliated
with an institution located in the UK or in the US at the year of the publication.
The estimation techniques scatter widely. While the majority of the effect sizes are
estimated via OLS (328), 199 end-points are the result of a (system) GMM approach and
76 estimations are conducted by means of a within estimator. 301 effect sizes are results
of techniques – such as the 2SLS – that tries to account for a potential endogenous
relation between democracy and growth while 641 treat the above-mentioned relation
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as exogenous. Additionally, there are 87 estimations that account for a potential
non-linear effect in the democracy and growth nexus.
Covariate Included Excluded Inclusion ratio
Convergence 825 117 0.87
Human capital 490 452 0.52
Investments 399 543 0.42
Population size 365 577 0.39
Trade openness 348 594 0.37
Government Size 255 687 0.27
Instability 190 752 0.20
Inflation 177 765 0.19
Rule of law 169 773 0.18
Property rights 127 815 0.13
Corruption 115 827 0.12
Ethnicity 58 884 0.06
Inequality 53 859 0.06
Physical capital 52 890 0.06
Economic freedom 43 899 0.05
Stateness 20 922 0.02
Religion 8 934 0.01
Culture 8 934 0.01
Table 2: List of covariates collected and their inclusion and exclusion rate
Finally, specifications are, as expected, widely heterogeneous. As shown in table
2 we tried to account for some of the most common control variables. Out of the
942 effect sizes collected the vast majority (825) include a variable to capture the
convergence process, 490 a proxy for human capital and 399 a measure of investments.
Conversely, only 53 effect sizes include measures of economic inequality and 43 a
proxy for economic freedom. As well as for inequality and economic freedom, cultural
variables such as religion and ethnicity are scarcely adopted by the scholars recorded
in our sample with, respectively, only 8 and 58 end-points9.
5 Results
According to the fixed effect model shown in table 3, the impact of democratic in-
stitutions on economic development, while weak in its magnitude, it is positive and
significant (1%). This seems to confirm the intuition firstly expressed by North (1990):
governments are tempted to appropriate the economic gains generated by individuals
and intermediate groups and “only democratic institutions can constrain them to act
in general interest” (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993, p. 144).
We must however note that, as explained in section 3, the inference obtained from
the fixed effect model cannot be generalized. This inference is bounded to the 103
papers that compose our sample.
To overcome the limits of such conditional inference we implement the random effects
model detailed in section 3.1.1. By explicitly assuming that the studies in our sample
are just an unknown proportion of the population of the researches investigating
9Further descriptives and the meta-sample composition are available in section A in table 6.
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Multilevel Meta-Analysis Model (y = 929; method: FE)
Variance Components: none
Model Results:
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
0.0358*** 0.0010 34.3106 <.0001 0.0337 0.0378
Table 3: Fixed effect multilevel meta-analysis. *, ** and *** denotes significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels; results reported are, in order, the estimated coefficient,
standard errors, p and z values and lower and upper bounds of the confidence interval.
the relationship between democracy and growth, we can extend our conclusions and
perform an unconditional inference.
The outcome shown in table 4 confirms the substantial inconclusiveness of the
literature on democracy and growth; while the coefficient is still positive and of a
similar magnitude as the one obtained in the fixed effect model, the multilevel random
effects model shows a weak statistically significant impact of democratic institutions
on economic growth (10%). Furthermore, the lower bound is now within the negative
region. Overall, the democracy and growth nexus is still a conundrum.
Multilevel Meta-Analysis Model (y = 929; method: REML)
Variance Components:
estim sqrt levels fixed factor
σ21 0.0301 0.1735 102 no study
σ22 0.0110 0.1047 929 no study/case
Model Results:
estimate se zval pval ci.lb ci.ub
0.0324* 0.0187 1.7373 0.0823 -0.0042 0.0690
Table 4: Random effects multilevel meta-analysis. *, ** and *** denotes significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels; results reported are, in order, the estimated coefficient,
standard errors, p and z values and lower and upper bounds of the confidence interval.
To identify the drivers behind these results, we start by investigating the between-
studies heterogeneity of our sample. Both of our models report a chi-squared statistic
(also known as Cochran’s Q) of 7037. Such statistical test is computed by summing
the squared deviations of each study estimate from the overall meta-analytic estimate,
using the same weights applied to meta-analysis models.
To interpret the meaning of the Cochran’s Q, we resort to the approach proposed
by Higgins et al. (2003) - the I2, that measures the between-studies consistency in a
meta-analysis as:
I2 =
(
Q − df
Q
)
× 100 (16)
where df are the degrees of freedom. I2 yields a value of 87%, which, accordingly to
the rule of thumb proposed by Higgins and Thompson (2002), indicates a considerable
heterogeneity. We investigate such high between-studies variance through the multilevel
regression model detailed in equation 12. Results and variables definition are outlined
in table 5. Results are robust to alternative model specifications.
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Multilevel meta-regression analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
intercept 0.022 0.096** 0.032 0.035 0.056** -0.013 -0.064
(-0.001) 0.041 (0.048) (0.034) (0.0.26) (0.040) (0.042)
Proxy for democracy
Polity -0.001 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.0021
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
FH 0.043** 0.045** 0.0477*** 0.047** 0.038**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019)
Dummy -0.050** -0.056** -0.041** -0.051** -0.041*
( 0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024) (0.023)
Proxy for growth
GDP gr. -0.084** -0.079**
(0.038) (0.034)
World Bank regions
Africa 0.251*** 0.254*** 0.255***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
E. Asia & P. 0.027 0.055 0.035
(0.059) (0.059) (0.060)
Europe & C. Asia 0.259*** 0.273*** 0.265***
(0.042) (0.049) (0.043)
High Inc. 0.020 0.020 0.017
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Lat. Am. & Carib. -0.161*** -0.163*** -0.162***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
MENA -0.061* -0.074** -0.061*
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
S. Asia -0.274*** -0.297*** -0.286***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052)
Estimation techniques
OLS Est. -0.029
(0.018)
Within Est. -0.061***
(0.018)
GMM Est. 0.036**
(0.016)
Endogenous -0.025*
(0.015)
Non-linear -0.116***
(0.029)
Covariates
Inflation 0.027 0.025
(0.024) (0.022)
Population -0.053** -0.044**
(0.025) (0.022)
Corruption -0.044 -0.039
(0.053) (0.052)
Rule of law -0.016 -0.007
(0.041) (0.039)
Eco. free -0.066 -0.049
(0.048) (0.045)
Prop. rights 0.011 0.012
(0.051) (0.048)
Instability -0.027 -0.022
(0.021) (0.018)
Human c. -0.024 -0.037
(0.025) (0.023)
Physical c. 0.034 0.074
(0.046) (0.044)
Converg. 0.039 0.037
(0.025) (0.025)
Opennes -0.010 -0.012
(0.017) (0.014)
Gov. size -0.014 -0.002
(0.023) (0.021)
Investment 0.010 0.007
(0.020) (0.018)
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Religion 0.027 0.002
(0.068) (0.061)
Ethnicity -0.005 -0.002
(0.052) (0.048)
Time periods
1950s 0.022
(0.035)
1960s -0.089***
(0.025)
1970s 0.056**
(0.024)
1980s 0.114***
(0.025)
1990s 0.033
(0.029)
2000s -0.078***
(0.028)
Table 5: *, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels; standard
errors in parenthesis. Variables definition; Proxy for democracy identifies the inde-
pendent variable adopted. Baseline is Other, a dummy = 1 that captures all the effect
sizes that adopt neither the Polity Index, nor the Freedom House Index, nor Dummy
variables to gauge democracy. Proxy for growth is GDP growth, a dummy = 1 if the
effect size dependent variable is a measure of GDP (both per capita and aggregate)
growth. Baseline is GDP level, which captures GDP (both per capita and aggregate)
levels. Spatial characteristics is based on the World Bank regions’ definitions and each
variable assumes the value of 1 if at least one country in the sample adopted in the
primary research is in that specific region. Estimation techniques: OLS est., Within est.
and GMM est. are dummies that captures, respectively, OLS, within estimation and
GMM estimation techniques. Endogenous is equal 1 if the study uses models that tries
to account for the potential endogeneity between democracy and economic growth.
Non-linear is equal 1 if the model includes a non-linear specification for democracy.
Covariates indicates, through dummies, variables listed as inputs in the primary stud-
ies. Time characteristics is a set of 6 dummies related to the decades included in the
primary studies.
Proxy for democracy The first panel of table 5 shows that the choice of alternative
proxies for measuring democracy weakly affects the strength and direction of the
relationship. In particular, the choice of the popular Freedom House Indices signifi-
cantly increases the probability of finding a positive relationship between democracy
and growth, while the opposite is true when democracy is proxied by a dichotomous
variable simply discriminating between democracy and autocracy. A similar result is
obtaining by using the Polity Index, although this coefficient is very small in size and
not significant. These first results suggest that when democracy is measured according
to procedural definitions, its effect on growth is more likely to be neglectable or even
slightly negative. Conversely, when a more substantial definition is chosen, as in the
case of the Freedom House indicators, it is more likely to capture a positive relationship:
however, in this case it is not clear whether the effect is truly driven by the regime
type or by other institutional components included in such broader definitions of
democracy.
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Proxy for growth The second panel simply show that the probability of obtaining
a negative relation is higher when the dependent variable is proxied by GDP growth
rates than GDP levels, although the magnitude of the coefficient is small.
World Bank regions This panel refers to the group of countries included in the
primary studies. As table 5 shows, results are highly driven by the countries and
regions that researchers choose to investigate. The size of these effects is the largest
among those that we estimate.
Following the regional classification used by the World Bank, we discover that
democratic institutions have a strong and positive impact (1%) on economic growth in
(Sub-Sahara) African and (Eastern) European countries. If such regions are included
within the samples, scholars are more likely to report the bright side of democracy. It is
likely that in these countries democratic institutions intertwine with other institutional
settings that support total output generation (Barro, 1991; Przeworski and Limongi,
1993).
The opposite is true for Latin America (1%) and South Asia (1%), where democracy
has a detrimental effect on growth. The same applies to Middle East and North Africa,
albeit with a smaller magnitude and significant level (5 to 10%, depending on model
specification). In these countries, the theories of Huntington (1968) and Huntington
and Dominguez (1975) seems to prevail. Democracy, through an increased demands
for current consumption, reduces investment and hinders growth (Alesina et al., 1992;
Persson and Tabellini, 2003): here, authoritarian regimes can overcome such issue and
help countries to reach their growth potential10.
Our findings are mostly consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature
on the subject. In Latin America, where income inequality has historically been en-
demically high, claims for redistributions by lower income groups drive democratic
institutions to promote populist policies, which in turn contribute to bad economic
performances (Sachs, 1989; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). Similarly, in South Asia,
the lobbying power of some labor and industrial groups can lead to an inefficient invest-
ment allocation in democratic regimes, by promoting rent-seeking related inefficiencies.
Against this background, authoritarian political elites can have the autonomy needed to
promote economic growth without being restrained by rent-seekers’ pressures (Krieck-
haus, 2006).
Conversely, democracy enhances growth opportunities in Africa, where clien-
telism has historically been regarded as the region’s main political economy feature
(Wantchekon, 2003; Vicente and Wantchekon, 2009) and the first cause behind the
continent economic fragilities (Sandbrook and Barker, 1985). Indeed, authoritarian
regimes, which protect clientelistic interests, more likely allow corrupted politicians to
plunder economic gains (Krieckhaus, 2006).
Finally, no matter the specification we adopt, we find that the presence of East
Asian countries in the sample does not seem to matter for the results that scholars have
obtained. This is in contrast with the literature focusing on the positive impact of auto-
cratic institutions on economic growth in East Asia (Krieckhaus, 2006). Accordingly to
10This interpretation seems particularly fitting the cases of some of the Asian Tigers and of patrimoni-
alistic states in the MENA region.
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such literature, political elites, without the restraints imposed by democratic institu-
tions, can commit to promote rapid industrialization over all others social objectives,
hence fostering GDP growth (Cumings, 1984).
Overall, our results indicate that the democracy and growth nexus is not ubiquitous.
The impact of democratic institutions on economic growth is largely driven by regional
specific aspects, suggesting that some countries or regions might enjoy economic
development under autocracies, while others prosper under democratic institutions.
Further cross-country and cross-region analysis should therefore be drafted accordingly.
Estimation techniques The next panel in table 5 shows that alternative estimation
techniques tend to drive different outcomes. In particular, researchers adopting within
estimators are more likely to report the dark side of the relationship between democracy
and growth. The same applies for those researches that try to model non-linearities.
Considering that Fisher’s Z corrected partial correlation between democracy and growth
indicates that a non-linear effect might exist, future researches on the topic should then
take it into account.
Effect sizes estimated by means of System GMM estimation techniques report a
positive and significant (5%) result, albeit small in magnitude. Probably this result
suggests that accounting for the dynamics of the democratization and growth processes
lead to find a positive nexus between democracy and growth. However, the size of
such nexus is indeed very small (almost one-tenth) when compared to most regional
dummies.
Moreover, controlling for endogeneity seems to have a small and weakly significant
effect on the outcomes. Yet, there is a vast literature on the reverse causality relation
between democratic institutions and growth (e.g. Lipset, 1959; Barro, 1999). However,
it must be considered that instrumental variable(s) (IV) estimators (the most common
technique used to addressed this issue) have larger standard errors than OLS and fixed
effect (FE) estimators. Therefore, it is more difficult to find a statistically significant
effect while accounting for endogeneity. This issue could explain why the size and
significance of our Endogenous control variable are smaller than expected.
Control variables The largest panel in table 5 reports the results relating to most
of the control variables that scholars have used over the years to model the relation
between democracy and growth. Our meta regression models reports some strong and
statistically significant coefficients, as shown above. However, the fact the almost all
control variables-related coefficients are not significant is probably the most striking
outcome of our analysis: specifications of the augmented production function do not matter.
With the only exception of the growth rate of population, all the covariates included in
the models we analyzed do not affect the results.
Such outcome, which is robust to different specifications is remarkable considering
the attention that researchers have dedicated at growth regressions’ covariates over the
last three decades (Sala-i Martin, 1997).
Time periods Finally, the last panel reports a further important result of our analysis:
not only regions, but also time matters. The coefficients of the dichotomous variables
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included in the bottom panel of table 5 highlight that the studies’ time span does matter
for the sign of the relationship between democracy and growth. In particular, including
the 1960s increases the probability of observing a negative relationship. This result
is consistent with the fact that during the 1960s a relevant subset of democratizing
countries were experiencing the de-colonization phase. Thus, despite a formal increase
in their democracy levels, they were also experiencing economic turmoils, hence low
(or even negative) growth rates. Conversely, including 1970s and 1980s increases the
probability of obtaining a positive relationship. The progressive stabilization of the
de-colonization processes, and the begin of the downturn of the Soviet block could
be interpreted as a golden age of the democracy and growth relationship. Finally, the
2000s crises drive instead the negative and significant coefficient of this dummy.
6 Conclusion
The relationship between democracy and economic growth has long been investigated
both in the political science and in the economic literature with inconclusive outcomes.
By adopting the meta-analysis framework, we tried to shed lights on this conundrum.
We began by creating a hierarchical sample of 103 studies containing 942 obser-
vations - the largest sample of effect sizes dealing with such an issue. The conditional
inference indicates that democracy has a positive effect on economic growth; however,
when we extend such inference to the population of potentially existing studies by
adopting a random effects model - to perform an unconditional inference - we find that
the impact of democracy, albeit weakly positive, loses much of its statistical strength.
Our meta-analysis documents a high degree of between-studies heterogeneity (I2 =
87%) that we investigated by adopting meta-regression techniques. Results are striking:
the effect sizes collected are largely driven by spatial and time differences in the sample,
indicating that the democracy and growth nexus is not ubiquitous across world’s
regions and over time, but largely depend on the characteristics of the regions and
periods themselves.
Which characteristics are relevant is however less clear. The (several) control
variables included in the papers to account for potential confounding effects, do not
impact the reported point estimates. At the same time, models estimated by means of
the within estimator have a significant, albeit negative, impact on economic growth.
Considering that the latter have been used to control for omitted variables - or
better, time-constant unobserved heterogeneity - there are number of possibilities to
explain such result.
First: despite their best efforts, scholars have not yet found the control variable(s)
that matter(s) to explain such much-debated relationship.
Second: had the covariates, controlling for the democracy and growth nexus, been
correctly identified, the way to measure them is still an unknown unknown - e.g. how to
measure property rights or economic freedom is still matter of debate.
Third, and consequently: we cannot rule out the possibility that there is no such
thing as a control variable, measured by a unique proxy, able to explain the relation
between democracy and growth always and everywhere.
Our findings suggest that further research is needed to better assess which expla-
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nation is more fitted. As of today, the drivers of the relation between democracy and
growth are still largely a conundrum. Standing from our results, the debate is unlikely
to end soon.
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A Meta-sample: further descriptives and forest plot of
effect sizes
Author(s) pc.z.mean pc.z.sd pc.z.min pc.z.max
Acemoglu et al. (2014) 0.036 0.014 0.013 0.092
Acemoglu et al. (2008) 0.097 0.008 0.082 0.102
Adams & Klobodu (2016) -0.007 0.173 -0.195 0.147
Aghion et al. (2007) 0.081 0.070 -0.034 0.176
Aisen & Veiga(2013) -0.044 0.048 -0.086 0.001
Albornoz & Dutta (2007) -0.069 0.297 -0.438 0.288
Alesina & Rodrik (1994) -0.009 0.024 -0.025 0.008
Alesina et al. (1996) 0.042 NA 0.042 0.042
Ali (2003) -0.048 0.254 -0.432 0.330
Ali & Crain (2001) -0.001 0.020 -0.015 0.014
Almeida & Ferreira (2002) -0.013 0.057 -0.078 0.021
Antic (2004) -0.020 0.025 -0.037 -0.002
Assane & Pourgerami(1994) 0.049 0.035 0.003 0.099
Assiotis & Sylwester (2014) 0.094 0.117 0.022 0.631
Assiotis & Sylwester (2015) 0.218 0.135 0.121 0.414
Baklouti & Boujelbene (2015) -0.346 NA -0.346 -0.346
Barro & Lee (1993) 0.001 0.309 -0.217 0.220
Barro (1996a) 0.200 0.100 0.052 0.328
Barro (1996b) 0.086 0.130 -0.081 0.231
Barro (2000) 0.122 0.004 0.119 0.125
Baum & Lake (2003) -0.006 0.013 -0.016 0.003
Bleaney & Nishiyama (2002) 0.467 0.068 0.380 0.543
Bluedorn (2001) -0.124 0.047 -0.185 -0.070
Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya (2007) -0.057 0.046 -0.115 -0.017
Chatterji (1998) 0.217 0.034 0.184 0.264
Chen (2003) 0.598 0.234 0.248 0.741
Chousa et al. (2006) 0.159 NA 0.159 0.159
Collier (1998) 0.184 NA 0.184 0.184
Collier (2000) 0.091 0.074 -0.015 0.252
Comeau (2003) -0.369 0.226 -0.548 0.226
Dasgupta et al. (2013) 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.013
Dawson (1998) 0.066 0.040 0.038 0.094
De Haan & Siermann (1995) 0.118 0.045 0.003 0.180
De Haan & Siermann (1996a) 0.022 0.070 -0.065 0.124
De Haan & Siermann (1996b) 0.005 0.402 -0.768 0.348
De la Croix & Delavallade (2011) -0.055 0.016 -0.090 -0.044
De Luca et al. (2013) 0.088 NA 0.088 0.088
Deana & Gamba (2008) -0.016 0.022 -0.032 -0.001
Decker & Lim (2008) 0.035 0.073 -0.120 0.313
Dias & Tebaldi (2012) 0.036 0.017 0.008 0.057
Diebolt et. al (2013) -0.310 0.125 -0.422 -0.112
Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu (2006) 0.004 0.045 -0.028 0.036
Drury et al. (2006) -0.005 0.030 -0.025 0.030
Durham (1999) 0.010 0.056 -0.065 0.099
Esfahani & Ramirez (2003) -0.151 0.090 -0.234 0.003
Fedderke & Klitgaard (1998) 0.093 0.186 -0.201 0.315
Feng (1996) 0.391 0.146 0.093 0.465
Feng (1997) -0.233 0.112 -0.399 -0.159
Feng (1995) 0.093 0.182 -0.213 0.376
Fida & Zakaria (2011) -0.531 0.254 -1.158 -0.260
Fidrmuc (2003) 0.147 0.288 -0.673 0.614
Flachaire et al. (2014) 0.022 0.076 -0.089 0.082
Fosu (2008) -0.251 0.189 -0.477 0.079
Gasiorowski (2000) -0.077 0.025 -0.105 -0.057
Gerring et al. (2013) 0.023 0.020 -0.022 0.042
Gerring et al. (2005) 0.084 0.074 -0.017 0.278
Ghosh et al. (2013) 0.064 0.174 -0.108 0.251
Glaeser et al. (2004) 0.230 NA 0.230 0.230
Goldsmith (1995) 0.359 0.096 0.292 0.427
Grier & Tullock (1989) 0.151 0.120 -0.024 0.270
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Grindler & Krieger (2015) 0.075 0.043 -0.002 0.160
Gupta et al. (1998) 0.059 NA 0.059 0.059
Gupta (1988) -0.239 0.157 -0.351 -0.128
Gwartney et al. (1999) -0.208 0.203 -0.442 -0.084
Haggard & Tiede (2011) -0.009 0.045 -0.071 0.108
Heckelman (2010) 0.812 0.793 -0.436 1.670
Helliwell (1994a) -0.583 NA -0.583 -0.583
Helliwell (1994b) -0.048 0.101 -0.128 0.065
Henisz (2000) 0.170 0.100 0.086 0.307
Iqbal et al. (2012) 0.372 0.051 0.331 0.443
Jacob & Osang (2015) -0.018 0.038 -0.097 0.096
Jalles (2010) 0.113 0.064 0.010 0.192
Jamali et al. (2007) 0.120 0.058 0.079 0.161
Jaunky (2013) 0.022 NA 0.022 0.022
Jetter (2014) 0.022 0.038 -0.046 0.102
Kagochi et al. (2007) 0.309 0.000 0.309 0.309
Kang et al. (2013) -0.180 0.074 -0.240 -0.097
Ken Farr et al. (1998) 0.034 0.217 -0.120 0.187
Knack & Keefer (1995) 0.050 0.057 -0.020 0.119
Knutsen (2013) 0.099 0.039 0.041 0.168
Kormendi & Meguire (1985) 0.168 0.145 0.065 0.271
Krieckhaus (2006) -0.062 0.771 -1.978 1.531
Krieckhaus (2004) -0.064 0.259 -0.529 0.295
Kurzman et al. (2002) -0.071 0.028 -0.103 -0.045
Landau (1986) -0.107 0.044 -0.186 -0.037
Leblang (1997) 0.184 0.051 0.127 0.238
Leblang (1996) 0.105 0.030 0.084 0.127
Li & Zou (1998) -0.157 0.261 -0.603 0.061
Lopes & de Jesus (2015) 0.150 0.122 -0.057 0.272
Lundberg & Squire (2003) -0.462 NA -0.462 -0.462
Masaki & Van de Walle (2014) 0.053 0.023 0.001 0.077
Masaki & Van de Walle (2014) 0.053 0.023 0.001 0.077
Mbaku & Kimenyi (1997) 0.470 0.194 0.167 0.829
Miguel et al. (2004) 0.000 NA 0.000 0.000
Minier (2003) 0.175 0.152 0.022 0.386
Minier (1998) 0.164 0.122 0.030 0.284
Mo (2000) -0.243 0.098 -0.444 -0.074
Mo (2001) -0.345 0.191 -0.722 -0.181
Mo (2015) -0.194 0.086 -0.289 -0.061
Mobarak (2005) -0.021 0.094 -0.198 0.146
Nelson & Singh (1998) 0.160 0.004 0.157 0.165
Oliva & Rivera-Batiz (2002) 0.183 0.057 0.096 0.297
Owen et al. (2009) 0.015 0.012 0.007 0.024
Zouhaier & Karim (2012) -0.180 0.096 -0.248 -0.112
Table 6: Summary statistics of partial correlation transformed through Fisher’s Z score)
of estimations reported in primary studies. pc.z.mean is the average, pc.z.sd the standard
deviation, pc.z.min and pc.z.max are respectively the lower and upper bounds. Studies
with pc.z.sd =NA only include a single effect size and studies in which the Fisher’s Z
score partial correlation could not be computed.
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Figure 1: Forest plot of raw partial correlation effect sizes. Years is the average time-
span of the primary analysis. Countries number is the average number of countries
investigated within the study. RePec 10 if is the RePec 10 years discounted impact
factor. 95% confidence interval.
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